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Abstract 
Recently van De Van, Creedy and Lambert (2001) and Lambert and Urban (2005) 
have reconsidered the original Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994) 
decomposition of the redistributive effect in order to properly evaluate personal 
income tax reforms, when sequential income groups do not concern exact equals. 
Lambert and Urban (2005) decompose the Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani index into 
three terms. We utilize this decomposition in choosing the optimal bandwidth set 
and suggest to consider not only the highest vertical contribution to the 
redistributive effect, but also the horizontal inequity due to the reranking of the 
mean post-tax income among groups. Findings are applied to Italian data with 
respect to both individual nominal incomes and equivalent household incomes. 
 
JEL Classification Numbers: H23; H24. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Decomposing redistributive effect across groups of pre-tax equals into vertical, 
horizontal and reranking effect has been intensively studied in the last years. The 
original work by Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994) considers exact pre-tax equals 
in portioning the pre-tax income distribution. 
As van de Ven, Creedy and Lambert (2001) pointed out, in the real word taxation 
this is not the case: only groups with close pre-tax incomes can be considered. They got 
through this problem in order to individuate the optimal bandwidth that should be used 
in decomposing the redistributive effect as the Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994) 
methodology suggests. 
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In this work we come back to this point by proposing a new measurement 
methodology. We focus on the idea that the optimal bandwidth should be individuated 
by looking not only to the highest vertical contribution to the redistributive effect, but 
also to the horizontal inequity due to the reranking of the mean post-tax income among 
groups. In doing so we propose a decomposition of the Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani 
index in three terms, following the decompositions applied in Lambert and Urban 
(2005). Using this decomposition, the optimal bandwidth can be individuated without 
leading to misleading results: a bandwidth with which the vertical effect is the highest 
and there is no reranking of the mean post-tax income among groups can be considered 
the best one to be adopted. 
Findings are applied to Italian data with respect to both individual nominal incomes 
and equivalent household incomes. Following Ebert and Moyes (2000) household 
analysis we studied the changes in the redistributive effect decomposition using 
different equivalent scales and different definitions of income accruing to each 
individual within the household. Then we analyze the Personal Income Tax reforms 
proposed in Italy in the period 2004-2007 and give some suggestions on the goodness of 
these reforms. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we revisit the original 
Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994) decomposition. Section 3 explains the 
elaborations we propose to individuate the optimal bandwidth. In Section 4 we suggest 
some useful interpretations for evaluating personal income tax reforms in Italy, 
decomposing the redistributive effect using a bandwidth which falls within the 
“optimal” bandwidth set. 
2. Aronson-Johnson-Lambert RE and Atkinson-Plotnick-
Kakwani R indexes re-examined 
 
Let yG  and TyG −  be the Gini index on the gross and net incomes respectively. The 
redistributive index RE is equal to Tyy GGRE −−= . It is well-known that the Gini 
coefficient fails to decompose across subgroups into between- and within-group 
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inequality components in case the subgroup income ranges overlap. Aronson, Johnson 
and Lambert (1994) consider the following decomposition of the post-tax Gini 
coefficient: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]TyTyyyW TyWyB TyBy CGCGGGGGRE −−−− −−−+−+−= , where ByG  and 
B
TyG −  are the between-group Gini coefficients, 
W
yG  and 
W
TyG −  are the within-group Gini 
coefficients, yC  and TyC −  are the post-tax concentration coefficients. 
If pre-tax groups are chosen partitioning an income parade in non decreasing order, 
such that the maximum of a group is not greater than the minimum of the following 
group, then y yG C= . Moreover, even if they do not make an explicit statement, 
Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994) implicitly assume that after taxation (i) the group 
average incomes maintain the same ranking as before taxation and (ii) the within group 
orderings remain the same as before taxation. If this is the case 
( ) ( )B B W Wy y T y y TRE G G G G R− −= − + − − , being R the Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani reranking 
index. 
Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994) originally limit the analysis to the case in 
which the population groups contain the exact pre-tax equals. This implies 0=WyG , so 
that y
B
y GG = . In this special case RE can be further simplified and written as 
B W
y y T y TG G G R− −− − − , where B Tyy GG −−  is the vertical potential redistribution effect, 
which looses part of its potentiality whenever, after taxation, either within group 
inequality index W TyG −  or group overlapping index (equal to the Atkinson-Plotnick-
Kakwani reranking index in this special case) y T y TR G C− −= −  becomes different from 
zero. 
However, as observed before, this decomposition can be correctly applied provided 
that each group is composed by observations with the same pre-tax income and taxation 
does not modify either the ranking among group averages or the within group rankings 
(van de Ven, Creedy and Lambert, 2001; Urban and Lambert, 2005; Vernizzi, 2006). In 
the real word taxation WyG  is generally different from zero, as only groups with close 
pre-tax incomes can be considered. As a consequence, only bandwidths of income 
containing close-equals must be chosen. 
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Being more general, neither the mean post-tax income of each group maintains the 
same order of the mean pre-tax income of each group nor, within each group, the order 
of the incomes remains unchanged in the transition from the pre- to the post-tax 
incomes; then the residual of the RE decomposition is generally not equal to the 
Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani index. We happened to observe these violations using a 
SHIW dataset, even if the magnitude of these unpleasant outcomes depends on the 
income range (bandwidth) chosen for each group. In particular the bigger the income 
range defining each group, the less likely group average incomes overlap in the 
transition from the pre- to the post-tax incomes; the opposite case happens to within 
group incomes. The income bandwidth acts in the same direction towards group 
reranking and within group reranking: the larger the bandwidth is, the less probable is 
the former and the more frequent happens to be the latter. 
In addition, as the bandwidth increases, WyG  can be no more close to zero, so that 
RE cannot be no more evaluated as B W B B Wy y T y T y y T y TG G G R G G G R− − − −− − − = − − − , rather 
it becomes more realistic to turn back to the more complete decomposition 
( ) ( ) * *B B W Wy y T y y TRE G G G G R V H R− −= − + − − = − − , having defined W Wy T yH G G−= −  and 
* *
y T y TR G C− −= − , being *y TC −  the concentration index for the after tax income parade 
ordered (i) according to the after tax ranking for group income average and (ii) such that 
within group incomes are in not decreasing order1. 
The decomposition proposed in van de Ven, Creedy and Lambert (2001) shows that 
an arbitrary specification of close-equals groups can lead to misleading results; it cannot 
consider all the inequality-related elements in the subgroup analysis. 
In this work we give back the idea of constituting close-equals groups, and focus on 
the eventual enlargement of the within group inequality ( )W Wy T yG G H− − =  term, 
together with the group overlapping term *R , to measure the loss in potential vertical 
redistribution effect measured by ( )B By y TG G V−− = . 
                                                 
1 We observe that generally B By y TG G −≥ , whilst W Wy y TG G −≤ , so that ( ) 0B By y TG G V−− = ≥  and ( ) 0W Wy y TG G H−− = − ≤ . 
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As Urban and Lambert (2005) show2, the difference between ( )y T y TG C− −−  is not 
necessarily limited to the overlapping or transvariation term3 *R ; it may include also a 
reranking effect for group averages together with a within group reranking effect: 
moreover it is likely that the former can vanish only if the latter increases, thanks to an 
enlargement of the bandwidth. 
The Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani index can then be decomposed into three terms: 
( ) ( ) ( )TyTyTyTyTyTyTyTy CCCCCGCGR −−−−−−−− −+−+−=−= ??**  where ? TyC −  is the 
concentration index of the post-tax incomes provided that post-tax incomes maintain the 
same order within each group (condition (ii)) without imposing condition (i), i.e. the 
post-tax group average incomes are in non decreasing order. The above specified 
components of the Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani index may be defined as: 
- *1 y T y TR G C R
∗
− −= − =  is the transvariation index among groups; 
- ? TyTy CCR −
∗
− −=2  measures the horizontal inequity due to the reranking of the 
mean post-tax income among groups; 
- TyTy CCR −− −= ?3  measures the horizontal inequity due to the reranking within 
groups. 
In so doing we obtain 321 RRRR ++= , where ∗= RR1 . So, thanks to RE we can 
still evaluate how horizontal inequity affects vertical redistribution potentiality, being 
horizontal inequity measured by ( )W Wy y TH G G −= −  and by * y T y TR G C∗− −= − ; thanks to 
the decomposition of R we can further control for income average reranking among 
groups and measure within group reranking of incomes after taxation. In our opinion 
what should be avoided is the income average reranking and, in the meanwhile, as van 
de Ven, Creedy and Lambert (2001) suggest, 
RE
V  should be maximized. 
 
 
                                                 
2 See also Vernizzi (2006) for analytical details. 
3 Transvariation is a term used by Dagum (1997). 
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3. On determining the optimal bandwidth 
 
This section explains how the RE decomposition and the extension of the Atkinson-
Plotnick-Kakwani index can be useful to evaluate the effects of changes in the Personal 
Income Tax. We analyze the redistributive effect of the Italian Personal Income Tax 
during the 2004 to 2007 year with respect both to individuals and to households4. 
In order to convert households’ incomes into equivalent incomes we adopt the 
Cutler scale. If we consider the h-th family which has hN  components split into hNA  
adults and hNC  children aged 18 or less, the Cutler scale is given by the expression 
( )h h hCS NA NC= + βα , where α  and β  are two parameters that range between zero 
and one. In this section the decomposition has been investigated for 0.5=α  and 
0.65=β . Ebert and Moyes (2000) observe that, in applying equivalence scales, the 
choice of the weight may be arbitrary: we consequently decided to weigh equivalent 
incomes either by the lower and the upper bound, the former being 15 and the latter 
being the component number associated to each family6. We label the equivalent 
income parade m(1) if the weight attributed to each family is 1, and we label the same 
income parade as m(n), if the weight is equal to the number of family components. 
Figures 1-9 show the percentage measures of 100−
RE
V , 
RE
H , 
RE
R∗ , and the 
percentage of 1R , 2R  and 3R  on R calculated using bandwidths w that range between 10 
to 3,000 euro. The graphs for the RE and R components show a quite similar behavior 
either for individual incomes or equivalent incomes in each of the three years here 
considered. 
RE
V  initially increases up to bandwidths around 300 euro, then is constant 
and, finally, shows a decreasing trend. The line becomes the more irregular the more it 
departs from the axes origin: the irregularities are more similar to irregular waves than 
to completely random white noises. 
                                                 
4 The 2004 Italian SHIW dataset provides demographic and post-tax income microdata for a representative cross-section of 12,713 
taxpayers and 8,012 households (20,581 individuals). This data were used to obtain gross and net incomes according to the Italian 
Personal Income Tax (Pellegrino, 2007b). Once the 2004 gross income parade was obtained, the 2006 and 2007 distribution was 
obtained considering the impact of the inflation rate (Pellegrino, 2007c). 
5 0α β= = . 
6 1α β= = . 
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Figure 1: V/RE, H/RE, R*/RE and R % decomposition - Individuals in 2004 
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Figure 2: V/RE, H/RE, R*/RE and R % decomposition - Individuals in 2006 
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Figure 3: V/RE, H/RE, R*/RE and R % decomposition - Individuals in 2007 
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Figure 4: V/RE, H/RE, R*/RE and R % decomposition – m(1) Households in 2004 § 
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Figure 5: V/RE, H/RE, R*/RE and R % decomposition – m(1) Households in 2006 § 
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Figure 6: V/RE, H/RE, R*/RE and R % decomposition – m(1) Households in 2007 § 
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§ m(1) means Cutler scale α=0.50 β=0.65 and family weight = 1. 
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Figure 7: V/RE, H/RE, R*/RE and R % decomposition – m(n) Households in 2004 $ 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
V 
  H
   
R
st
ar
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 2200 2400 2600 2800 3000
Bandwidth
V H
Rstar
0
20
40
60
80
100
R
1 
  R
2 
  R
3
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 2200 2400 2600 2800 3000
Bandwidth
percR1 percR2
percR3
 
 
Figure 8: V/RE, H/RE, R*/RE and R % decomposition - m(n) Households in 2006 $ 
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Figure 9: V/RE, H/RE, R*/RE and R % decomposition - m(n) Households in 2007 $ 
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$ m(n) means Cutler scale α=0.50 β=0.65 and family weight = Nh. 
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The horizontal effect 
RE
H  is always monotonically increasing (in absolute value): 
when bigger bandwidths are considered 
RE
GW Ty−  rises quicker than 
RE
GWy . If we consider 
RE
R∗ , it initially increases (in absolute value) up to 100=w , then monotonically 
decreases. Analogously to 
RE
V , 
RE
H  and 
RE
R∗  plots becomes irregular as they depart 
from the axes origin: they take the same irregular wave contour as 
RE
V . 
Turning to the decomposition of the Plotnick index, ? TyTy CCR −
∗
− −=2  becomes 
close to zero for bandwidths bigger than 400: this means that for bandwidths larger than 
400, group average incomes do not present significant rerankings due to taxation. 
The transvariation index among groups *1 y T y TR G C R
∗
− −= − =  decreases and the 
horizontal inequity due to the reranking within groups TyTy CCR −− −= ?3  increases. 
In looking at graphs which represent R decompositions, we observe the same 
phenomenon we observed for RE decompositions: line becomes more irregular when 
departing from the axes origin. 
Van de Ven, Creedy and Lambert (2001) suggest to choose the optimal bandwidth 
in correspondence to the maximum value assumed by 
RE
V . Looking at Figures 1-9 we 
observe that it is not so immediate to individuate an optimal point by the above reported 
criterion. In correspondence of bandwidths increasing by 10 euro up to 3,000 
RE
V  is not 
always strictly increasing with respect to the bandwidth, so that the optimal bandwidth 
should be chosen considering at the same time 
RE
V  trend and its local steadiness. 
Moreover, in the spirit of Aronson-Johnson-Lambert’s idea, we suggest that the 
optimal value for 
RE
V  should be chosen when there is no significant reranking for group 
average incomes, that is when 2R
R
 is almost zero; a considerable value for 
R
R2  may 
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make unreliable the value of  B Ty
B
y GGV −−=  itself if calculated on two average income 
parades which do not match. 
In order to draw 
RE
V  trend and to evaluate its local steadiness, we fitted7 
RE
V  
curves represented in Figures 1-9 as a function of the group bandwidths by 
nonparametric regressions: the kernel function adopted was the uniform with a 
smoothing bandwidth large about 260 euro (130 at the beginning and at the end). The 
observed curves, together with the fitted curves, grouped for individual nominal 
incomes and family equivalent incomes (either with weight 1 and weight equal each 
family component number), are reported in Figures 10-12. 
We can confirm that between bandwidth 250 and 900 euro, 
RE
V  presents a 
sequence of local maximum points which show a relative stability.  
Table 1: The root mean square errors in fitting (V/RE)× 100 
  0-250 bandwidths 
251-900 
bandwidths 
901-3,000 
bandwidths 
Individual nominal incomes 2004 0.06908 0.00954 0.04552 
Individual nominal incomes 2006 0.09256 0.01260 0.05576 
Individual nominal incomes 2007 0.08823 0.01277 0.05310 
m(1) Family equivalent incomes 2004 0.10936 0.01098 0.02429 
m(1) Family equivalent incomes 2006 0.09637 0.00881 0.02316 
m(1) Family equivalent incomes 2007 0.10090 0.00883 0.02062 
m(n) Family equivalent incomes 2004 0.12891 0.01137 0.02568 
m(n) Family equivalent incomes 2006 0.10865 0.00912 0.02310 
m(n) Family equivalent incomes 2007 0.11936 0.00948 0.02145 
Source: Own elaborations.    
In the 250-900 interval the root mean square errors of the non-parametric fitting are 
definitely lower both than those calculated for bandwidths less than 250 and than those 
                                                 
7 Non parametric regressions were performed applying the econometric package SHAZAM 10. 
10 Differences between pair of indexes were tested according to the here described procedure:  (i) assuming normality by the test 
function ( ) { } { } { } { }2 21 2 1 2 2 1 2t Index Index se Index se Index se Index se Index= − + − ⋅ ⋅  having estimated standard errors 
{ }1se Index and { }2se Index by 200 bootstrap replications. Notice that in the above test function correlation 1 is assumed between 
Index1 and Index2, which gives the maximum absolute value for t; (ii) in all cases t rejects index equality, we estimated  95% 
percentile intervals and { }1 2se Index Index−  for ( )1 2Index Index− by 200 bootstrap replications and accepted index equality 
whenever percentile intervals included 0 and ( ) { }1 2 1 2t Index Index se Index Index= − −  was not significantly different from zero 
under normality. Procedure (ii) was always applied for individuals and just in 2006 for  m(1) families. Incidentally we observe that 
bootstrap 95% percentile intervals are not so different from normal 95% normal intervals, calculated by bootstrap standard error 
estimates. 
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calculated for bandwidths bigger than 900; they are 7-10 times lower than the former 
ones and 2-4 times lower than the latter ones (Table 1). 
Figure 10: (V/RE)× 100 - Actual and fitted values for Individuals 
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Figure 11: (V/RE)× 100 - Actual and fitted values for m(1) Households 
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It is worth to stress that the phenomenon that causes an unsatisfactory fitting in the 
bandwidth set 0-250, are quite different from those that makes unsatisfactory the fitting 
in the bandwidth set 901-3,000: in the former set a strongly increasing trend for 
RE
V  
makes difficult for a function of the sole bandwidth to follow the actual points. In the 
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latter differences between the fitted line and the actual ones are due to the presence of 
irregular waves which becomes larger in correspondence of larger bandwidths. 
Figure 12: (V/RE)× 100 - Actual and fitted values for m(n) Households 
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When 450>w  the percentage of 2R  on R becomes lower than 1%: we can then 
conclude that, for bandwidths larger than 450 euro, post-tax income parades show a 
reranking for average group incomes quite insignificant. 
This is a desirable property to be satisfied. Tables 2-7 report the values for RE and 
R decompositions, evaluated at bandwidths 100, 700 and 2,000; together with punctual 
values, the table reports 95% confidence intervals obtained by 2,000 bootstrap 
replications percentiles. We can observe that the confidence intervals for 
RE
V  present 
large overlaps among the three bandwidths; if we perform tests for equality of 
RE
V  at 
100-700 and 700-2,000 bandwidth at 5% significance we always accept equality for all 
tax systems and all income distributions10. The same does not happen for 2R
R
: here 
confidence intervals associated to 100 euro bandwidth do not overlap with confidence 
intervals for 700 and 2,000 euro bandwidth11.  
                                                 
11 When 95% confidence intervals do not overlap, index inequality is rejected at a significance level even lower than 5%. 
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Table 2: RE decomposition – Individuals 
(bootstrap estimated 95% confidence intervals in parentheses-2,000 replications) 
 
 
  2004 2006 2007 
% RE/Gy  14.370 (14.109-14.620) 
13.453 
(13.211-13.684) 
14.003 
(13.747-14.243) 
 bandwidth % RE 
 100 101.036 (100.649-101.424) 
101.361 
(100.932-101.835) 
101.317 
(100.894-101.774) 
V 700 101.086 (100.632-101.516) 
101.448 
(100.949-101.953) 
101.364 
(100.902-101.866) 
 2000 101.004 (100.538-101.492) 
101.320 
(100.818-101.892) 
101.390 
(100.871-101.950) 
 100 0.076 (− 0.317-0.461) 0.091 (− 0.379-0.562) 0.087 (− 0.347-0.510) 
H 700 0.407 (− 0.041-0.854) 0.502 (0.027-1.002) 0.471 (0.002-0.939) 
 2000 0.671 (0.208-1.154) 
0.855 
(0.291-1.388) 
0.898 
(0.398-1.421) 
 100 0.960 (0.894-1.032) 
1.270 
(1.182-1.370) 
1.230 
(1.139-1.326) 
R* 700 0.679 (0.629-0.734) 
0.945 
(0.875-1.020) 
0.893 
(0.823-0.967) 
 2000 0.333 (0.300-0.367) 
0.465 
(0.418-0.513) 
0.492 
(0.445-0.543) 
Source: Own elaborations.     
Table 3: R decomposition – Individuals 
 (bootstrap estimated 95% confidence intervals in parentheses-2,000 replications)  
 
 
  2004 2006 2007 
% R/RE  1.087  (1.014-1.166) 
1.432 
(1.333-1.543) 
1.389 
(1.296-1.490) 
 bandwidth % R 
 100 88.286  (87.185-89.345) 
88.700 
(87.547-89.834) 
88.556 
(87.388-89.720) 
R1 700 
62.450  
(61.300-63.610) 
66.029  
(64.977-67.140) 
64.250 
(63.112-65.369) 
 2000 30.589  (28.932-32.304) 
32.458 
(30.757-34.205) 
35.412  
(33.666-37.115) 
 100 4.596 (3.482-5.620) 
4.816 
(3.694-6.052) 
5.308 
(4.089-6.514) 
R2 700 
0.067 
(0.022-0.135) 
0.035 
(0.000-0.085) 
0.034 
(0.000-0.089) 
 2000 0.000 (0.000-0.046) 
0.000 
(0.000-0.018) 
0.017 
(0.000-0.018) 
 100 7.112 (6.839-7.403) 
6.485 
(6.245-6.759) 
6.136 
(5.887-6.375) 
R3 700 37.483 (36.219-38.719) 
33.936 
(32.851-35.032) 
35.717 
(34.569-36.874) 
 2000 69.411 (67.600-71.197) 
67.542 
(65.799-69.292) 
64.571 
(62.909-66.333) 
Source: Own elaborations.     
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Table 4: RE decomposition – m(1) Households 
(bootstrap estimated 95% confidence intervals in parentheses-2,000 replications) 
 
 
  2004 2006 2007 
% RE/Gy  13.927 (13.545-14.287) 
13.328 
(13.002-13.634) 
13.852 
(13.510-14.187) 
 bandwidth % RE 
 100 101.270 (100.625-101.975) 
101.062 
(100.357-101.740) 
101.132 
(100.497-101.777) 
V 700 101.335 (100.528-102.197) 
101.102 
 (100.225-101.900) 
101.209 
 (100.393-102.082) 
 2000 101.253 (100.364-102.187) 
101.052 
(100.158-101.925) 
101.135 
(100.247-102.117) 
 100 0.100 (− 0.544-0.756) 0.090 (− 0.553-0.771) 0.089 (− 0.588-0.776) 
H 700 0.525 (− 0.284-1.362) 0.456 (− 0.379-1.251) 0.465 (− 0.376-1.330) 
 2000 0.832 (− 0.108-1.778) 0.706 (− 0.213-1.616) 0.742 (− 0.115-1.647) 
 100 1.170 (1.078-1.276) 
0.972 
(0.897-1.056) 
1.043 
(0.963-1.138) 
R* 700 0.811 (0.736-0.888) 
0.646 
(0.591-0.713) 
0.744 
(0.677-0.817) 
 2000 0.421 (0.375-0.472) 
0.346 
(0.308-0.389) 
0.394 
(0.350-0.440) 
Source: Own elaborations.     
Table 5: R decomposition – m(1) Households 
(bootstrap estimated 95% confidence intervals in parentheses-2,000 replications)  
 
 
  2004 2006 2007 
% R/RE  1.349 (1.240-1.473) 
1.126 
(1.040-1.222) 
1.211 
(1.118-1.322) 
 bandwidth % R 
 100 86.762 (85.374-88.090) 
86.323 
(84.894-87.640) 
86.068 
(84.557-87.439) 
R1 700 
60.107 
(58.683-61.488) 
57.380 
(55.815-58.872) 
61.408 
(59.901-62.866) 
 2000 31.219 (29.170-33.110) 
30.701 
(28.604-32.850) 
32.502 
(30.458-34.562) 
 100 5.710 (4.335-7.136) 
5.562 
(4.178-7.010) 
6.596 
(5.109-8.130) 
R2 700 
0.474 
(0.154-0.906) 
0.361 
(0.025-0.721) 
0.359 
(0.042-0.744) 
 2000 0.040 (0.000-0.099) 
0.048 
(0.000-0.124) 
0.042 
(0.000-0.084) 
 100 7.528 (7.181-7.859) 
8.115 
(7.733-8.466) 
7.336 
(6.997-7.676) 
R3 700 39.419 (38.018-40.862) 
42.259 
(40.771-43.895) 
38.232 
(36.846-39.750) 
 2000 68.741 (66.896-70.575) 
69.251 
(67.274-71.328) 
67.463 
(65.447-69.529) 
Source: Own elaborations.     
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Table 6: RE decomposition – m(n) Households 
(bootstrap estimated 95% confidence intervals in parentheses-2,000 replications) 
 
 
  2004 2006 2007 
% RE/Gy  13.451 (13.045-13.824) 
13.035 
(12.674-13.373) 
13.559 
(13.197-13.918) 
 bandwidth % RE 
 100 101.354 (100.654-102.125) 
101.104 
(100.366-101.850) 
101.215 
(100.493-102.012) 
V 700 101.435 (100.478-102.427) 
101.153 
(100.197-102.141) 
101.316 
(100.405-102.287) 
 2000 101.387 (100.279-102.506) 
101.145 
(100.107-102.176) 
101.254 
(100.183-102.298) 
 100 0.103 (− 0.632-0.829) 0.092 (− 0.641-0.868) 0.091 (− 0.682-0.849) 
H 700 0.548 (− 0.392-1.560) 0.464 (− 0.494-1.390) 0.483 (− 0.457-1.472) 
 2000 0.913 (− 0.127-1.984) 0.761 (− 0.228-1.807) 0.799 (− 0.306-1.827) 
 100 1.251 (1.141-1.372) 
1.012 
(0.927-1.107) 
1.124 
(1.028-1.231) 
R* 700 0.887 (0.802-0.985) 
0.688 
(0.623 -0.757) 
0.833 
(0.756-0.924) 
 2000 0.474 (0.417-0.538) 
0.384 
(0.338-0.436) 
0.454 
(0.397-0.517) 
Source: Own elaborations.     
Table 7: R decomposition – m(n) Households 
(bootstrap estimated 95% confidence intervals in parentheses-2,000 replications)  
 
 
  2004 2006 2007 
% R/RE  1.452 (1.323-1.601) 
1.183 
(1.085-1.292) 
1.320 
(1.203-1.444) 
 Bandwidth % R 
 100 86.104 (84.458-87.601) 
85.539 
(84.004-87.080) 
85.167 
(83.444-86.850 
R1 700 
61.061 
(59.402-62.665) 
58.196 
(56.371-59.916) 
63.098 
(61.398-64.784) 
 2000 32.654 (30.413-35.078) 
32.431 
(30.020-34.974) 
34.430 
(32.093-36.944) 
 100 6.688 (5.117-8.329) 
6.689 
(5.044-8.333) 
7.974 
(6.130-9.783) 
R2 700 
0.538 
(0.138-0.974) 
0.447 
(0.069-0.864) 
0.518 
(0.119-0.947) 
 2000 0.058 (0.000-0.106) 
0.071 
(0.000-0.173) 
0.040 
(0.000-0.105) 
 100 7.207 (6.824-7.600) 
7.772 
(7.374-8.198) 
6.858 
(6.464-7.286) 
R3 700 38.401 (36.834-40.067) 
41.357 
(39.537-43.154) 
36.384 
(34.703-38.099) 
 2000 67.288 (65.088-69.541) 
67.499 
(65.021-69.892) 
65.530 
(63.119-68.009) 
Source: Own elaborations.     
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Even if we cannot always accept equality between 2R
R
 associated to 700 and 2,000 
bandwidths, observing that when fixing bandwidth at 700 euro, 2R  confidence intervals 
never exceed 1% of R, we conclude that such a bandwidth is large enough to perform 
tax law evaluations by the Bank of Italy data base. The tables show that the point 
estimates are quite reliable but for 
RE
H : this index presents quite relative confidence 
intervals, which include negative values. This implies that somewhere Gini index within 
groups may be lower after taxation then before. 
4. Evaluating personal income tax reforms 
 
In this section we consider the redistributive effect RE and the reranking effect R of 
the Italian PIT, with respect to both individual incomes and equivalent incomes. 
Equivalent incomes are evaluated by nine different Cutler scale levels: the scales 
are obtained by combining three different values for β  (0.50, 0.65, 0.80) and three 
different values for α  (0.30, 0.50, 0.70). The resulting incomes are then weighed by the 
corresponding values of the scale itself. We use this special weighting version for two 
reasons: the total amount of both the gross and the net incomes are not affected with 
respect to the original nominal values; the way of determining the weights lies between 
the ones used for the m(1) and the m(n) methods. 
Together with RE and R, we present their respective components V, H, R* and 
*1 RR = , R2, R3; these components are evaluated at the 700 euro bandwidth, which we 
concluded to be optimal in the previous section. Due to the fact that inequality measures 
depend on scales, all indexes are reported as percentage of the Gini index associated to 
the corresponding pre-tax equivalent income parade, in order to get comparable 
measures. All results are summarized in Table 8. 
In what it concerns family equivalent incomes, we observe that the actual 
redistributive effect RE ranges from 12.83 to 13.76 percent point of the pre-tax Gini 
index; the potential V ranges from 13.00 to 13.93; both RE and V presents maximum 
values in 2007 and minimum in 2006. 
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Table 8: RE and R decomposition – households (weight=scale) and individuals 
(bootstrap estimated standard errors in parentheses: 200 replications) 
Cutler scale 
parameters 
α β 
Year (RE/Gy)% (V/Gy)% (H/Gy)% 
(R*/Gy)% 
(R1/Gy)% 
(R/Gy)% (R2/Gy)% (R3/Gy)% 
    2004 13.4886 (.1751) 
13.6957 
(.1756) 
.0707 
(.0589) 
.1364 
(.0051) 
.2075 
(.0065) 
.0006 
(.0002) 
.0705 
(.0023) 
0.30 0.50 2006 12.9990 (.1725) 
13.1710 
(.1594) 
.0613 
(.0618) 
.1106 
(.0042) 
.1733 
(.0062) 
.0008 
(.0004) 
.0619 
(.0020) 
    2007 13.5126 (.1474) 
13.7031 
(.1460) 
.0636 
(.0601) 
.1269 
(.0049) 
.1927 
(.0071) 
.0009 
(.0004) 
.0649 
(.0022) 
    2004 13.7295 (.1826) 
13.9255 
(.1874) 
.0748 
(.0633) 
.1212 
(.0054) 
.1985 
(.0076) 
.0010 
(.0003) 
.0763 
(.0026) 
0.30 0.65 2006 13.2132 (.1637) 
13.3717 
(.1411) 
.0638 
(.0548) 
.0947 
(.0043) 
.1604 
(.0054) 
.0006 
(.0002) 
.0651 
(.0021) 
    2007 13.7587 (.1667) 
13.9410 
(.1533) 
.0672 
(.0657) 
.1151 
(.0055) 
.1806 
(.0061) 
.0009 
(.0004) 
.0646 
(.0022) 
    2004 13.5685 (.1884) 
13.7748 
(.1825) 
.0843 
(.0623) 
.1220 
(.0056) 
.2076 
(.0083) 
.0005 
(.0002) 
.0852 
(.0031) 
0.30 0.80 2006 13.1428 (.1753) 
13.3035 
(.1551) 
.0697 
(.0683) 
.0910 
(.0043) 
.1637 
(.0064) 
.0004 
(.0002) 
.0723 
(.0025) 
    2007 13.6634 (.1803) 
13.8494 
(.1516) 
.0739 
(.0617) 
.1122 
(.0057) 
.1870 
(.0068) 
.0005 
(.0003) 
.0744 
(.0026) 
    2004 13.4507 (.1809) 
13.6556 
(.1746) 
.0704 
(.0627) 
.1345 
(.0054) 
.2047 
(.0073) 
.0006 
(.0002) 
.0696 
(.0025) 
0.50 0.50 2006 12.9787 (.1583) 
13.1466 
(.1359) 
.0603 
(.0610) 
.1076 
(.0043) 
.1686 
(.0056) 
.0010 
(.0004) 
.0600 
(.0020) 
    2007 13.4800 (.1606) 
13.6667 
(.1464) 
.0626 
(.0610) 
.1241 
(.0049) 
.1893 
(.0066) 
.0013 
(.0005) 
.0639 
(.0023) 
    2004 13.6413 (.1899) 
13.8365 
(.1707) 
.0752 
(.0648) 
.1200 
(.0052) 
.1974 
(.0069) 
.0010 
(.0004) 
.0764 
(.0026) 
0.50 0.65 2006 13.1491 (1695) 
13.3019 
(.1486) 
.0620 
(.0625) 
.0908 
(.0037) 
.1565 
(.0052) 
.0007 
(.0003) 
.0651 
(.0023) 
    2007 13.6764 (.1867) 
13.8550 
(.1606) 
.0665 
(.0693) 
.1121 
(.0052) 
.1788 
(.0066) 
.0008 
(.0003) 
.0658 
(.0023) 
    2004 13.4229 (.1852) 
13.6305 
(.1772) 
.0852 
(.0718) 
.1224 
(.0057) 
.2086 
(.0074) 
.0004 
(.0003) 
.0858 
(.0028) 
0.50 0.80 2006 13.0269 (.1577) 
13.1855 
(.1509) 
.0691 
(.0658) 
.0895 
(.0044) 
.1614 
(.0057) 
.0004 
(.0002) 
.0714 
(.0026) 
    2007 13.5236 (.1827) 
13.7103 
(.1557) 
.0740 
(.0730) 
.1127 
(.0053) 
.1875 
(.0070) 
.0005 
(.0002) 
.0744 
(.0031) 
    2004 13.3800 (.1737) 
13.5832 
(.1843) 
.0699 
(.0602) 
.1333 
(.0052) 
.2041 
(.0072) 
.0007 
(.0002) 
.0702 
(.0025) 
0.70 0.50 2006 12.9243 (.1726) 
13.0900 
(.1327) 
.0592 
(.0593) 
.1065 
(.0040) 
.1662 
(.0057) 
.0006 
(.0004) 
.0590 
(.0021) 
    2007 13.4129 (.1684) 
13.5977 
(.1305) 
.0620 
(.0609) 
.1228 
(.0051) 
.1883 
(.0068) 
.0011 
(.0005) 
.0644 
(.0023) 
    2004 13.4982 (.2072) 
13.6968 
(.1899) 
.0763 
(.0638) 
.1223 
(.0038) 
.1994 
(.0070) 
.0008 
(.0003) 
.0764 
(.0032) 
0.70 0.65 2006 13.0280 (.1632) 
13.1824 
(.1419) 
.0625 
(.0648) 
.0919 
(.0038) 
.1564 
(.0052) 
.0005 
(.0002) 
.0640 
(.0024) 
    2007 13.5361 (.1764) 
13.7172 
(.1515) 
.0674 
(.0639) 
.1136 
(.0056) 
.1808 
(.0068) 
.0008 
(.0003) 
.0664 
(.0026) 
    2004 13.1970 (.1989) 
13.4103 
(.1727) 
.0876 
(.0745) 
.1258 
(.0055) 
.2134 
(.0081) 
.0006 
(.0002) 
.0871 
(.0025) 
0.70 0.80 2006 12.8276 (.1806) 
12.9895 
(.1525) 
.0703 
(.0652) 
.0916 
(.0042) 
.1644 
(.0061) 
.0005 
(.0002) 
.0723 
(.0025) 
    2007 13.2989 (.1723) 
13.4902 
(.1715) 
.0757 
(.0669) 
.1156 
(.0054) 
.1933 
(.0073) 
.0006 
(.0003) 
.0771 
(.0029) 
    2004 14.3699 (.1253) 
14.5259 
(.1111) 
.0584 
(.0307) 
.0976 
(.0035) 
.1562 
(.0053) 
.0001 
(.0000) 
.0586 
(.0020) 
Individuals 2006 13.4535 (.1198) 
13.6482 
(.1105) 
.0676 
(.0358) 
.1272 
(.0049) 
.1926 
(.0066) 
.0001 
(.0000) 
.0654 
(.0022) 
    2007 14.0034 (.12615) 
14.1943 
(.0003) 
.0660 
(.0391) 
.1250 
(.0046) 
.1945 
(.0065) 
.0001 
(.0000) 
.0695 
(.0022) 
Source: Own elaborations.     
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Looking at individual nominal incomes, the maximum is in 2004 and the minimum 
in 2006 for both indexes: differences between associated RE and V do not exceed 0.2% 
of the corresponding pre-tax Gini index. H and R* never exceed, respectively, 0.09 and 
0.14. 
However, whereas H presents standard errors which are almost equal to H punctual 
estimates themselves (sometimes even greater), R* standard errors are twenty times less 
than R* estimates: it follows that there is a significative group overlapping component 
which lowers the potential redistributive effect V, whilst the within group inequality 
component H is never significantly different from zero. 
R and R3 reports very small relative standard errors as well: 30 times lower that 
their respective estimates; even the negligible R2 estimates present rather relatively 
small standard errors. 
When we pass to consider reranking effects of tax systems, looking at household 
equivalent incomes, both overall reranking R index and interval overlapping R* as well 
as within interval R3 indexes present maximum values in 2004 and minimum values in 
2006: 2007 estimates are at an intermediate position. Evaluating tax systems from 
nominal individual incomes, 2004 has minimum horizontal iniquity indexes; however 
whilst the group overlapping index R* is maximum in 2006, R and R3 register their 
maximum value in 2007. 
The 2007 tax reform has significantly14 increased the overall reranking index R, the 
group overlapping index, both with respect nominal individual incomes and family 
equivalent ones 15. The within group reranking index R3 is always significantly different 
both between 2004 and 2006-2007 for individual incomes; it is not significantly 
different from zero just for family equivalent incomes between 2006 and 2007. 
Conversely, 1* RR = is always significantly different both between 2004 and 2006-
2007 for equivalent family incomes; it is not significantly different from zero for 
individual incomes just between 2006 and 2007. 
When considering households equivalent incomes under the aspect of minimal 
reranking, the 2006 tax system is the best and the 2004 one is the worst among the three 
                                                 
14 Differences between pair of indexes have been tested both (i) assuming normality by the test function 
( ) { }1 2 1 2Index Index se Index Index− − , having estimated the standard error { }1 2se Index Index− by 200 bootstrap replications and 
(ii) by checking if zero is included in the 95% percentile interval estimated for ( )1 2Index Index− by200 bootstrap replications. 
15 It is rather is amazing that 2007 reform R increases also for individuals with respect to 2006 tax system. 
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here analyzed: the 2007 system appears as a worsening of the 2006 one, even if it 
remains still better than the 2004 system. When considering individual nominal 
incomes, the best oriented appears to be the 2004 system, but, amazingly, the 2007 
reform not only is worse than the 2004 system, but it seems to be a bit worse even than 
the 2006 one 1* RR =  is the only reranking index which is lower in 2007 than in 2006, 
but the difference is not significantly different from zero.  
We observe that if we consider V, H, R* and R3 as percentages of their associated 
RE, when 
RE
V  is maximum, generally 
RE
H , 
RE
R* , 
RE
R , and 
RE
R3  are maximum too; the 
same happens, even with some exceptions, mostly for R3/RE, when V/RE is minimum. 
The here considered tax systems seems to show a positive relation between 
redistributive effect and reranking effects. In what it concerns the parameters attributed 
to the Cutler scale, if we decide to base our choice on the global reranking index R, we 
conclude that the optimal value for β  seems to be 0.65, whilst different values of α  do 
not seem to modify substantially reranking indexes. 
5. Conclusions 
 
When close pre-tax equals groups instead of exact pre-tax ones are considered, the 
residual component in the original Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994) model is not 
the Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani index, but only the transvariation index among groups. 
In addition, other two components should be considered when close pre-tax equals 
are used in empirical applications: the reranking of the mean post-tax income among 
groups and the reranking within groups. Then a further problem arises: an optimal 
bandwidth must be chosen in order to properly decompose the redistributive effect into 
vertical, horizontal and reranking effect. 
Van de Ven, Creedy and Lambert (2001) individuate the optimal bandwidth that 
should be used in decomposing the redistributive effect as the Aronson, Johnson and 
Lambert (1994) methodology suggests without considering the different contribution of 
the reranking of the mean post-tax income among groups and the reranking within 
groups. Following Lambert and Urban (2005), we use a decomposition of the Atkinson-
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Plotnick-Kakwani index in three terms in order to propose a new measurement 
methodology for the individuation of the optimal bandwidth. 
According to our analysis, it should be individuated by looking not only to the 
highest vertical contribution to the redistributive effect, as van de Ven, Creedy and 
Lambert (2001) suggest, but also to the horizontal inequity due to the reranking of the 
mean post-tax income among groups: we chose the optimal bandwidth which can lead 
to the highest vertical effect in presence of no reranking of the mean post-tax income 
among groups. 
In what it concerns the Bank of Italy survey, it seems that a good bandwidth to 
perform tax evaluations in Italy could be 700 euro large: 
RE
V  corresponding to this 
bandwidth, if not an absolute maximum, lies in the set of highest 
RE
V  values, moreover, 
the average group reranking index assumes negligible values. 
On the basis of this methodology, we compare changes in the tax code proposed in 
Italy during the period 2004-2007. The 2006 tax law shows lower reranking effects if 
households equivalent incomes are considered, whilst the 2004 tax law presents 
minimal reranking effects if individuals incomes are considered; 2007 reranking effects 
lie between 2004 and 2006 ones for equivalent family incomes, whilst they are the 
highest for individual incomes. Of course family equivalent income analysis depend on 
the here adopted equivalence scales; in order to limit scale arbitrariness we applied the 
Cutler scale, allowing for the children parameter α and the overall parameter β to 
assume each three different values: (0.30; 0.50; 0.70) for the former and (0.50; 0.65; 
0.80) for the latter. 
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